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Through the last two rounds of multilateral tariff
negotiations, the Kennedy Round and the Tokyo Round, discussions
have been dominated by the interests of the three major trading
blocs, the U.S., the EEC, and Japan. All three groups have sought
to exempt certain domestic industries from the negotiations. The
EEC and Japan have vigorously defended their agricultural sectors,
while the U.S. and other industrialized countries have protected
the domestic textile and clothing industries. Consequently, the
products of greatest immediate interest to the less-developed
countries (LDCs) have not been the object of significant
reductions in tariffs or nontariff barriers (NTBs).
However, the LDCs have not been excluded completely. Most of
the industrialized countries have substituted a scheme of sub-MFN
(Most Favored Nation) preferential tariffs on industrial imports
from their LDC trade partners under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), sponsored by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development.(UNCTAD). While most agricultural and
textile products are still excluded, this scheme does provide
needed foreign exchange and may stimulate long run
industrialization of the beneficiaries.
In this paper, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) of
the 9-member European Economic Community' (EEC) and that of the
five industrialized members of the European Free Trade
Association 2 (EFTA) will be examined. For this purpose the
import-disaggregated version of the Michigan computational model
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of world production and trade will be used to evaluate the trade,
price, and employment effects of the GSP schemes.
The EEC's GSP has been previously studied using both ex ante
and ex post techniques. Baldwin and Murraya adopt a partial
equilibrium framework in which tariff preferences are combined
with estimated import demand elasticities to calculate the change
in EEC imports from the beneficiaries. They conclude that in
1971, EEC imports from the beneficiaries increased by $217.3
million, or 25% of imports eligible for GSP treatment. Of this
increase in trade, only $18.1 million, or 8.3%, is the result of
trade diversion.
A difficulty with the Baldwin and Murray result is that a
large fraction of trade within GSP eligible categories does not
receive GSP treatment in practice. Adjusting for this factor,
Langhammer 4 reports that the gross trade creation effect obtained
from the Baldwin-Murray model is closer to 9% of beneficiary
exports of GSP-eligible product categories.
A similar partial equilibrium approach is used by Karsenty
and Lairds to estimate the gross trade creation effect of the EEC
and EFTA GSP schemes. In this study, beneficiary exports increase
by $2.6 billion based on trade in 1983, which is 2.4% of total
imports from the beneficiaries.
There are, of course, a number of general equilibrium changes
in goods prices, factor prices, and exchange rates which will tend
to reduce the first-round increase in preferential trade forecast
by the ex ante partial equilibrium models. In order to account
for the general equilibrium effects associated with the GSP,
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Sapir' uses an ex post cross-section gravity model to test the
significance of a binary GSP variable for the period 1967 to 1978.
His estimate of gross trade creation for ten of the major
beneficiaries is $153 million based on 1971 trade. This is a 24%
increase over 1971 EEC imports of GSP eligible products from these
countries. For 1976 Sapir estimates a gross trade creation effect
of $1.4 billion. However, it should be noted that the GSP
variable is statistically significant in 1973 and 1974 only.
Langhammer estimated this model for the period 1978 to 1980
and found the GSP variable to be significantly negative,
suggesting that the GSP is reducing beneficiary exports to the
EEC. The decline in LDC exports to the EEC may be the result of
the exchange of preferences between the EEC and EFTA in 1978 and
the diversion of developing country exports toward the U.S. due to
the introduction of the U.S. GSP.
Welfare conclusions drawn from these models are based on a
comparison of trade creation and trade diversion. However, in the
case of the partial equilibrium ex ante models, welfare gains to
the donor will be exaggerated to the extent that general
equilibrium changes in goods prices and exchange rates diminish
the change in trade.
The reduced form empirical models used by Sapir and
Langhammer cannot yield unambiguous welfare predictions by
comparing trade creation and trade diversion either. If the terms
of trade of the donor deteriorate due to the tariff reduction,
economic welfare may decline even if, on balance, there are
efficiency gains associated with trade creation.
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In the present study a general equilibrium computational
approach has been adopted which makes it possible to obtain
results for the terms of trade and welfare, as well as for trade
and employment. As with other studies, we find that the GSP
schemes of the EEC and EFTA are trade creating. The results show
that total imports from the beneficiaries increase by $129.6
million based on trade in 1976. Of this, $56.8 million is the
result of trade diversion. As expected, these trade figures are
somewhat smaller than those obtained from the partial equilibrium
models.
Nonetheless, welfare, as measured by the equivalent
variation, declines for all donor countries in the model.
Deterioration in the terms of trade of the donor countries offsets
the efficiency gain, resulting in a loss in welfare for all of the
members of the EEC and EFTA.
In the next section the GSP schemes of the EEC and EFTA will
be discussed and the preferential tariff margins will be
presented. The'computational model used to obtain these results
will then be described and numerical results will be discussed in
detail. Summary and conclusions follow.
II. The GSP Schemes of the EEC and EFTA
The EEC's GSP scheme7 is the largest of all members of the
OECD, covering $9.3 billion in 1980 trade. 8 This is nearly twice
the volume of U.S. preferential imports in the same year.
Nonetheless, among the preferential trading arrangements between
the EEC and its developing trade partners, the GSP is the least
generous in product coverage. More generous preferential
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treatment is offered to some of the member states' former colonies
under the Lomb Convention, making the GSP largely superfluous for
these beneficiaries. The EEC has also pursued a limited exchange
of preferences with some Mediterranean countries such as Greece,
Turkey, Morocco, Tunis, Malta, Cyprus, Spain, Israel, Egypt, and
Lebanon.
The EEC's GSP tends primarily to benefit members of the Group
of 77 not covered by other trade agreements. These are some of
the colonies excluded from the Lom6 Convention (Hong Kong, India,
and Singapore), the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) of Latin
America and Asia, and Yugoslavia.'
The GSP schemes of the EFTA members, while not as large as
the that of the EEC, resulted in $1.5 billion in preferential
imports in 1980. The EFTA members had fewer pre-GSP preferential
arrangements to preserve and so were less restrictive in the
choice of beneficiaries. Of the 16 LDCs in the present study,
only Portugal was excluded by all members of the EFTA. The
developing countries included in this study which are excluded
from various European schemes are listed in Table 1.
TABLE 1
DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXCLUDED BY
Greece EEC, Finland, Norway, Sweden




Spain EEC, Finland, Norway, Sweden
Taiwan EEC, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
Turkey EEC, Norway, Sweden
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The preferential tariff margins for 22 comprehensive product
categories are presented in Table 2 for the 15 major beneficiaries
included in this study. Ad valorem equivalent tariff rates are
aggregated from the line-item level to the BTN (Brussels Tariff
Nomenclature), weighted by total country imports, and then from
the BTN to the product categorization used in this study, weighted
by donor bilateral imports, yielding a separate set of tariffs for
each beneficiary. The GSP margins presented in Table 2 are the
difference between the average MFN and GSP ad valorem rates. The
margins may vary across goods and countries depending on the level
of the initial tariff concessions and the volume of bilateral
trade in preferred products. Tariff rate averages are based on
the MFN and GSP rates for 1976.
Under the GSP schemes of both the EEC and EFTA, duties are
suspended primarily on industrial products. Industrial raw
materials are excluded by the EEC to preserve the special
preferences granted to the African associated countries.
Preferential treatment of agricultural products is limited to
small tariff reductions on selected products to preserve
preferences granted to the tropical zone beneficiaries under the
Lom6 Convention and the Mediterranean countries. 10
As a result, preferential margins are largest in the
manufactured and semi-manufactured categories, ranging up to six
percentage points in some cases. The generally excluded products,
agriculture, food, metal products, iron and steel, and nonferrous
metals, have preferential margins which are less than one
percentage point. Raw materials, such as petroleum products, have
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small preferential margins because MFN rates are already close to
zero.
Though industrial products are broadly covered, eligibility
under the EEC's GSP is limited by quotas. 1 1 Imports exceeding the
quota are subject to the MFN tariff rate. In addition,
'individual country amounts' limit preferential imports from a
single beneficiary. Depending on the product category, a single
beneficiary may not supply more than 10% to 50% of the Community
quota. Restrictive 'rules of origin' also apply.
Consequently, a large volume of trade within the eligible
product categories does not actually receive preferential
treatment if quota limitations are binding, preferential treatment
is not requested, when rules of origin are not satisfied, or when
other administrative restrictions are limiting preferential
treatment. In calculating the GSP tariff rate averages, imports
within an eligible category which do not actually receive
preferential treatment are assumed to be subject to the MFN rate.
The GSP rate, then, is a weighted average of the GSP and MFN
tariffs where the weight is the fraction of trade within a product
category subject to each rate. Where information on individual
products was not available, product group averages were used.12
Across countries, the preferential margins are largest for
India and the Latin American beneficiaries (Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, Chile, and Colombia), ranging up to six percentage points.
Smaller margins are available to Yugoslavia and to the Asian NICs,
Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore. The preferential margins
for these countries are generally less than three percentage
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points. Margins are smallest for Greece, Israel, Spain, and
Taiwan.
The larger margins available to the Latin American LDCs can
be misleading. Although some tariff margins are comparatively
large, they do not apply to the important export categories of
these countries. For example, 95% of Chile's exports and 89% of
Colombia's exports are in product categories in which the tariff
margin is less than one percentage point. This pattern results
from the virtual exclusion of raw materials from the eligible
products list and the limited coverage of agricultural products.
Less agricultural and raw material-dependent countries, such as
Argentina and Brazil, still have 75-80% of trade in the low margin
categories. Only Mexico, with 65% in low margin categories,
enjoys substantial preferential treatment.
Opportunities are greater for the remaining beneficiaries
outside the western hemisphere. The share of exports in low
margin categories is comparatively small for India (34%), South
Korea (43%), Singapore (69%), Yugoslavia (34%), and Hong Kong
(67%).
III. The Computational Model
The computational model employed in this study is the import-
disaggregated version of the Michigan Model of world production
and trade, which covers trade among eighteen OECD countries and
sixteen of the major developing countries. (The rest of the world
constitutes an abbreviated 35th country.) Product categories are
aggregated into 29 industries, of which 22 are tradable and 7 are
non-tradable.
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The Michigan Model has been presented in detail elsewhere1 3 ,
so only a brief description is offered here. The implications of
some of the modeling choices for the simulation of the GSP are
more fully discussed in the following section.
III.1 Model Structure
The model consists of three blocks of equations. At the
country level there is a system of intermediate and final demand
equations for domestically produced tradable goods, imports, and
non-tradable goods. This block also contains the supply
equations, primary factor demands, and the determination of
personal income. The second block consists of the equilibrium
conditions in the world market which determine world prices
expressed in the numeraire currency, exchange rates, and trade by
the ROW. The third block of equations relates world prices and
exchange rates determined in the world system to domestic prices
in the country system. World prices are related to the domestic
price system by adjusting for changes in exchange rates, tariffs,
and other border controls. The three blocks are structured in the
following manner:
1. Final goods demands in the country system are derived by
maximizing an explicit utility function for a representative
individual. Intermediate demand is derived by maximizing profits
for a representative firm in each of the 29 industries based on an
explicit production functi'on, which depends on employment of the
29 intermediate inputs and two primary inputs: capital and labor.
Intermediate and final demand equations are then aggregated to
determine total demand for each good in each country in the model.
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Goods demands are disaggregated by place of production by the
Armington1 4 method. The utility and production functions are each
composed of two levels. At the first level, utility and
production are functions of the 29 goods, undistinguished by place
of production. At this level the utility function is Cobb-Douglas
and the production function uses inputs in fixed proportion. At
the second stage each of the 22 tradable goods is itself an
aggregate of the products supplied by the 34 countries and the
ROW. The aggregation function at this stage is CES.
The implication of the Armington demand structure is that the
variety of a good produced by each country is imperfectly
substitutable for the varieties produced by all other countries in
the model. Consequently, with 22 tradable goods produced by 35
country blocs and 7 non-tradable goods, for each country there are
29 demand equations for the domestically produced goods and 748
import demand equations.
Supply conditions are determined by assuming that goods
markets are perfectly competitive. Thus, each individual firm's
supply price must equal marginal and average cost. The supply of
exports is given by the difference between production and local
demand for the domestically produced good.
The factors markets reflect the short-run nature of the
model. The wage paid to labor is held fixed and capital is
assumed to be sector specific. Equilibrium in the labor market is
determined by macroeconomic policy. After-tax personal income is
adjusted to generate sufficient final demand to maintain national
employment at the base level.
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2. Equilibrium goods prices are determined in world markets
which equate export supply and import demand for each of the 22
tradable goods from each of the 34 included countries and the ROW,
yielding 770 individual markets and prices.
Exchange rates for most industrialized countries fluctuate to
maintain the nominal trade balance at the base level. Normally,
the exchange rate would not have a role in a real trade model.
However, the nominal wage is held fixed so that fluctuations in
the exchange rate alter the real wage.
Some countries, such as Australia and the EFTA countries
(excluding Austria), peg their exchange rates to a basket of
currencies. Among the LDCs, Hong Kong, Israel, Yugoslavia, and
Mexico allow their currencies to float, but Singapore fixes its
exchange rate to a basket of currencies.
The remaining LDCs, along with New Zealand, peg their
currencies, but also impose the condition that expenditure on
imports not exceed the available foreign exchange earned through
exports. This is accomplished with an endogenously determined
tariff equivalent of the foreign exchange premium which constrains
the value of import demand to be equal to the revenue earned
through exports.
3. World prices are related to domestic prices in each
country by adjusting world prices for exchange rates, tariffs, and
nontariff barriers (NTBs). The NTBs may take the form of a quota
or target price and are represented by their endogenously
determined tariff equivalents. The tariff equivalent is found by
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solving for the tariff rate which will hold imports or the import
price to the specified level.
The target price mechanism is included for the purpose of
modeling the variable levy on imports of agricultural products by
the EEC. All other NTBs are represented by the quota facility.
Due to aggregation, several border policies may apply to a
single product category. Therefore, the tariff rate which applies
to each product category is a weighted average of nominal tariffs
and the tariff equivalent of each of the applicable NTBs, where
the weight is the fraction of the sector subject to the relevant
policy. 1
The trade effects of the GSP are calculated by exogenously
raising the GSP inclusive tariff averages to the MFN rates. The
model is too large to be solved using nonlinear techniques.
Therefore, the equations are log differentiated, yielding a linear
system which relates changes in exogenous variables to changes in
endogenous variables.
The -base year for data on production, employment, trade, and
tariffs for each of the 34 countries is 1976. Input-output
coefficients for the production function were derived from the
U.S. input-output table for 1972, and the 1970 tables for each of
the members of the EEC, Japan, and Brazil. The elasticity of
substitution in the CES function used to aggregate products from
different sources was derived from import demand elasticities
reported in Stern."' The elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor in the production function was obtained from
Zarembka and Chernicoff. 1 7
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111.2 Modeling Preferential Trading
It is useful to consider how the modeling choices affect the
outcome of the computations. First, use of the Armington
assumptions underlying the demand structure implies that products
are nationally differentiated. The Armington method was adopted
because the more familiar assumption of product homogeneity is
difficult to implement empirically. To see the problem, consider
a three-country two-good model in which both goods can and are
produced in all three countries. A characteristic of this model
is that two of the country groups are net exporters of the same
good, and hence do not trade with one other. However, even in
finely disaggregated trade data, three-way trade tends to occur.
Consequently, studies of preferential trading (e.g., Baldwin
and Murray, Sapir, Karsenty and Laird, and Langhammer) have more
commonly assumed that varieties of a good imported from separate
sources are imperfectly substitutable. In such a model, three-way
trade exists both before and after the preferential tariff
reduction.
In a general equilibrium context, the assumption of national
product differentiation has some unusual terms-of-trade and
welfare implications. First, the preferential tariff reduction
will be trade diverting, inducing substitution away from the non-
pref erred import toward the preferred import in the donor
countries. This will result in excess demand for the
beneficiary's export and excess supply for the excluded country's
export on the world market. To restore equilibrium, the world
price of the beneficiary's export should rise and the price of the
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non-beneficiary's export should fall. Thus, trade diversion
raises welfare for the beneficiary, while lowering welfare for the
non-beneficiary.
However, the preferential tariff will also have a trade
creating aspect, resulting in substitution away from the good
produced by the donor. Trade creation will tend to lower the
price of the donor's export on the world market. The
deterioration in the terms of trade of the donor will offset some
of the efficiency gains of the tariff reduction, so that the donor
may be worse off as a result of the preferential tariff.
In addition, the fall in the price of the donor country's
export on the world market will be beneficial to countries which
import from the donor. As a result, if trade creation is large
and trade diversion is small, some of the non-beneficiaries may
actually experience an improvement in the terms of trade and a
rise in welfare.
Third, the import pattern by the beneficiaries will also play
a role in determining the effect of a preferential tariff. The
beneficiaries will earn additional export revenue as a result of
the preferential tariff. Due to the assumption that the trade
balance is held constant, the newly earned foreign exchange will
be re-spent. A country which typically exports to the
beneficiaries will enjoy increased demand for its export and an
improvement in the terms of trade.
On balance, trade diversion, trade creation, and beneficiary
re-spending will have an ambiguous effect on the terms of trade
and welfare of the donor and the non-beneficiary. On the other
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hand, both trade creation and trade diversion improve the terms of
trade of the beneficiary, leading to an increase in welfare.
A second novelty of the Michigan Model is the use of import
licensing in some countries, rather than the exchange rate, to
maintain balanced trade. 18 A preferential tariff reduction by the
donor country will generate new foreign exchange for the
beneficiary. If the beneficiary imposes import licensing, the
foreign exchange premium falls. The change in the premium lowers
the tariff equivalent of the import license, and thus functions
like a tariff reduction. The internal price of imports falls
relative to the price of the domestically produced good, causing
consumers to substitute toward imports. On the world market, the
price of the good produced by the licensing country will tend to
fall and the price of the imported good will rise. Thus, the fall
in the foreign exchange premium, like any tariff reduction, could
have adverse terms-of-trade implications for licensing countries.
A currency appreciation, on the other hand, lowers the price
of both the import and the domestically produced good, at constant
world prices. Substitution toward the imported good will not
occur unless there is a fall in the world price of imported goods
and a rise in the world price of the domestic good. As a result,
changes in the terms of trade are not expected to accompany an
adjustment in the exchange rate. We expect, then, that the terms-
of-trade improvement for a licensing country from a preferential
tariff reduction by the EEC and EFTA is smaller than for a country
which has a floating exchange rate.
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IV. Computational Results
The computational results with respect to trade, terms of
trade, and welfare (as measured by the equivalent variation') due
to the GSP are summarized in Table 3. The increase in total
imports and exports by country are reported in columns (1) and
(2), respectively, while the increase in imports from and exports
to the EEC and EFTA are reported in columns (3) and (4). The
percent change in the terms of trade, the change in welfare, and
the change in welfare as a percent of GDP are reported in columns
(5), (6), and (7).
IV.l Trade
The estimated gross trade creation from the GSP schemes of
the EEC and EFTA is $129.6 million based on 1976 trade, which is
2.3 times the $56.8 million of trade diversion. 20  Trade diversion
primarily affects Europe's major trading partners, the U.S., whose
exports to the EEC/EFTA fall by $34.6 million, and Japan, whose
exports to the EEC/EFTA fall by $15.8 million. However, these are
very small amounts, less than 0.03% of the total exports of these
two countries.
The trade creation effect reported here is substantially
smaller than that obtained using partial equilibrium techniques by
Baldwin and Murray, Karsenty and Laird, or Langhamrner. The first
round increase in the volume of imports by the donor countries,
captured in partial equilibrium analysis, appears to be largely
dissipated by subsequent changes in relative prices and exchange
rates. Preferential treatment stimulates demand for developing
country exports, requiring an increase in price to restore
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equilibrium. Partial equilibrium models, which assume perfectly
elastic export supply, do not account for relative price changes
and thus overstate the trade creation effect of the tariff
reductions.
Balance of payments considerations further diminish the trade
impact of the GSP. Preferential tariff reductions tend to
generate a trade imbalance for the donor country. To restore the
trade balance, an offsetting currency depreciation is necessary.
Thus, it appears that general equilibrium effects materially
alter the trade impact of a preferential tariff. Given the small
trade creation reported here, it is not surprising that Sapir and
Langhammer did not consistently obtain a statistically significant
positive coefficient on the GSP variable from a gravity equation.
IV.2 Terms of Trade
Trade creation and diversion have terms-of-trade 2 1
implications for all countries of the model. The increase in
demand for developing country exports and the subsequent increase
in price will improve the terms of trade of the beneficiaries. On
the other hand, trade creation implies that the demand for goods
produced in the EEC and EFTA fall, reducing the price of donor
country exports. Similarly, trade diversion lowers the demand for
the exports of the non-beneficiaries, causing a fall in price and
a possible deterioration in the terms of trade.
Among the beneficiaries, the terms-of-trade gains are largest
for Yugoslavia (0.60%), Hong Kong (0.14%), Singapore (0.13%), and
Mexico (0.10%). In spite of the small preferential margins on
imports from the Asian NICs, Hong Kong and Singapore are among the
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countries with the largest terms-of-trade improvement. The
structure of preferences targets the manufacturing sectors and
thus tends to increase demand and raise the prices of the goods
produced by the more advanced of the developing countries.
In contrast, the terms of trade for most of the Latin
American LDCs decline even though these are the countries which
received the largest preferential margin. Although the tariff
changes are relatively large, the concessions do not apply to the
most important export categories for these countries, agriculture,
food, and raw materials. This is particularly the case for Chile
and Colombia.
However, Mexico is a notable exception. With only 25% of its
exports in agriculture, as compared to 68% for Argentina, Mexico
enjoys a terms-of-trade gain of 0.10%.
In addition to the difference in export orientation between
Mexico and the other Latin American developing countries, the
exchange rate regime plays an important role in determining the
terms-of-trade effects. A small terms-of-trade improvement is at
least partially the result of the import licensing scheme that we
assume is used by all the Latin American LDCs, except Mexico. The
licensing mechanism responds to a rise in export earnings by
reducing the tariff equivalent of the license on imports, thereby
stimulating imports in response to newly available foreign
exchange. Any increase in exports by the beneficiary is
automatically offset by a substitution of imports for the
domestically produced good by domestic consumers. As a result,
there is little or no increase in overall demand for domestically
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produced goods and correspondingly little increase in price. The
licensing mechanism, then, short circuits the normal channels
through which a preferential tariff would raise export prices of
the beneficiary. Consequently, the expected terms-of-trade
improvement does not emerge.
Mexico, on the other hand, is assumed to maintain its trade
balance with a floating exchange rate. Increased foreign demand
for exports creates excess demand for Mexican produced goods. The
excess demand is partially relieved by currency appreciation and
partially by increased Mexican prices, thus improving Mexico's
terms of trade.
Turning now to the industrialized countries, all the members
of the EEC and EFTA sustain a deterioration in their terms of
trade. This is most notably the case for Germany, for which the
terms of trade decline by 0.04%. While preferential treatment
increases demand for goods produced by the beneficiaries, it
reduces world demand for goods produced by the donor, thus
lowering the prices of the donor country's exports on world
markets.
The fall in export prices of the donor countries has
important implications for the non-beneficiaries. Trade diversion
would normally be expected to reduce the export prices of
countries such as the U.S. and Japan. But the fall in export
prices may be offset by a fall in the price of imports from
Europe. This appears to be the case in particular for Australia,
Japan, and the U.S. which experience an improvement in the terms
of trade.
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The importance of the price-lowering effect of trade creation
in the donor country is significant enough that its effect
sometimes exceeds that of preferential treatment of the
beneficiary. For example, Israel was largely excluded from the
GSP schemes of the European countries but still enjoys a terms-of-
trade gain-of 0.05%. India, on the other hand, benefits from
comparatively deep tariff concessions. However, the import
licensing scheme largely neutralizes the preferential effect on
domestic producers so that India's terms of trade improve by only
0.01%.
Changes in the terms of trade are reflected in the total
trade figures reported in columns (1) and (2). For those
countries which enjoy a terms-of-trade gain, imports increase by
as much or more than exports valued at base level prices. This
can be seen by comparing columns (1) and (2).22
The LDCs (except Singapore) and most of the industrialized
countries included in the model are assumed to maintain the
current account at the base level, either through the import
licensing mechanism or a fluctuating exchange rate. A country
which enjoys a rise in the price it receives for its exports will
be able to afford increased imports, while still satisfying the
balance of payments condition. Thus, the increase in the quantity
of imports must exceed the increase in exports for these
countries. As net imports (measured by quantity, not value) rise
total consumption and hence welfare also increase.
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IV.3 Welfare
The deterioration in the terms of trade for the donor
countries has important implications for the welfare effect of the
GSP. Forming welfare conclusions for the EEC and EFTA based on a
comparison of trade creation and trade diversion, as is done in
the partial equilibrium studies, is invalid if the terms of trade
also change.
Trade creation is more than two times greater than trade
diversion, yet welfare, measured by the equivalent variation,
declines for all of the donor countries. Germany's estimated
welfare loss is larger than for any other donor in absolute terms
at $45.2 million, which is 0.01% of 1976 GDP. Several other donor
countries also show losses -- the Netherlands (-$13.7 million),
France (-$13.3 million), the U.K. (-$9.7 million), Italy (-
$8.6 million), Switzerland (-$5.4 million), and Belgium-Luxembourg
(-$5.2 million). On the other hand, the terms-of-trade gains for
the U.S. and Japan result in a welfare improvement. U.S. welfare
rises by an estimated $10.1 million and Japan's welfare rises by
$13.9 million.
Among the beneficiaries, the welfare gains are largest for
Yugoslavia ($27.7 million), Hong Kong ($15.5 million), and
Singapore ($6.3 million). Welfare declines for several of the
Latin American LDCs which suffer a deterioration in the terms of
trade, such as Brazil (-$5.8 million), and for the developing
countries which receive minimal preferences under the GSP such as
Spain (-$2.8 million).
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Benefits under the EEC/EFTA GSP are distributed across all
beneficiaries which received significant tariff cuts in their
important export categories. This result contrasts sharply with
the analysis of the U.S. and Japanese GSP schemes by Brown 2 3 and
Sapir and Lundberg 2 4 in which the GSP preferences appear
overwhelmingly to benefit the Asian NICs. This difference in
results occurs for two reasons. First, as discussed above, tariff
concessions for the more developed of the developing countries are
limited through the use of the 'maximum country amounts'.
Consequently, the tariff margins for the Asian NICs are typically
smaller than for India, Yugoslavia, and the Latin American LDCs.
Second, the Community has a history, through colonial ties and
other trading arrangements, of pursuing trade with the developing
countries of the world. The U.S. and Japan, on the other hand,
trade to a much greater degree with the Asian NICs, resulting in
benefits concentrated on these partners.
IV.4 Employment
The employment effects of any trade policy are an important
component of the domestic debate. In Table 4, change in
employment by sector in each of the European donor countries is
reported. These results are most notable for their small size.
In no product category does employment fall by more than 1,000
workers. In fact, employment tends to rise in the product
categories in which the tariff concessions are greatest, semi-
manufacturing and manufacturing, while falling in agriculture,
textiles, and non-tradables. This is a result of the terms-of-
trade deterioration experienced by the donor countries. Terms-of-
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trade deterioration tends to stimulate exports to finance more
expensive imports. Consequently, production and employment
increase in the major export industries.
V. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented estimates of the trade,
price, welfare and employment effects of the GSP schemes of the
members of the EEC and EFTA, based on calculations using a general
equilibrium computational model of world production and trade.
The major results are as follows:
1. The developing countries included in the model increase
exports by $129.6 million to the members of the EEC and EFTA as a
result of the GSP. Of this, only $56.7 million is diverted from
the EEC and EFTA's industrialized country trade partners. The
results reported here are substantially smaller than those
obtained with partial equilibrium analysis by Baldwin and Murray,
Karsenty and Laird, and Langhammer. General equilibrium changes
in exchange rates and prices were found to offset a substantial
portion of the impact effect of the GSP on trade.
2. In spite of the positive net trade creation, welfare, as
measured by the equivalent variation, declined in all of the donor
countries. The reason is that the tariff reductions worsen the
terms of trade of these countries, with the result that the
efficiency gains are offset and welfare declines.
3. Among the LDCs, welfare gains were largest for
Yugoslavia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Gains for the Latin
American LDCs were small or negative despite the comparatively
large preferential margin afforded them by the GSP. The reason is
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that agriculture and food dominate the exports of these countries,
which diminishes the potential of preferential treatment to expand
exports. In addition, the import licensing mechanism partially
insulates domestic producers from the stimulative effects of trade
preferences. India was similarly affected.
4. The adverse effects of trade diversion on the
industrialized countries are relatively small. The U.S. and Japan
enjoy improvement in both the terms of trade and welfare as a
result of the GSP. This result emerges due to the fall in the
price of exports from the EEC and EFTA.
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TABLE 2
EEC AND EFTA GSP PREFERENTIAL TARIFF MARGINS
(Percentage Points)







































































































































3.4 4.6 2.7 3.4 2.6 2.2 3.8 0.1 2.2 3.7 2.3 0.2 0.0 2.0 1.5
5.7 1.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 3.4 5.2 0.1 3.8 0.4 2.8 0.1 0.0 0.4 1.3
0.1 3.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
3.1 3.8 1.9 1.9 0.0 2.1 3.5 0.1 2.5 4.6 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5
0.1 3.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7
2.9 1.1 3.1 3.9 1.3 1.8 1.5 0.3 2.2 3.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.1
0.5 1.1 4.2 1.5 0.0 2.5 0.7 0.2 1.0 0.6 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2
6.0 3.5 0.0 1.1 0.2 2.0 4.2 0.0 3.0 6.0 3.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.6
1.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9
4.6 4.5 2.2 2.2 0.0 1.5 3.1 0.2 1.3 3.9 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 2.8
3.5 3.8 2.1 1.8 0.0 2.0 2.6 0.1 1.4 3.6 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.4
3.7 4.0 1.1 1.4 0.0 0.6 1.8 2.9 1.4 3.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1
2.7 5.7 2.2 3.4 0.0 1.0 2.9 0.0 1.8 5.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8




data supplied by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and various UNCTAD

TABLE 3
CHANGE IN COUNTRY IMPORTS, EXPORTS, EEC & EFTA BILATERAL TRADE AND
TERMS OF TRADE DUE TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EEC & EFTA GSP
































































































































































































































































































































ATA BLX DEN FIN FR GFR IRE IT NL NOR SWD SWZ UK
TRADABLES
Agriculture 23.6 3.2 33.8 16.6 25.9 -159.9 10.6 -20.1 25.9 32.6 15.9 -35.8 -2.4
Food -6.9 -2.9 6.1 -2.7 -3.4 -105.4 -1.2 -6.6 -4.6 -2.0 -3.5 -18.3 7.4
Textiles 11.4 13.5 -1.8 -3.6 -3.3 80.7 0.5 22.5 12.5 -1.1 -3.0 21.3 -14.9
Clothing -20.2 -45.4 -3.8 16 -90.2 -287.4 -1.4 -194.4 -19.1 1.4 12.5 14.2 -55.6
Leather Prod. -18.3 -3.5 -3.8 -4 -9.5 -35.6 -2.4 -32.6 1.2 -0.3 -2.6 -5.9 -42.0
Footwear -4.1 -1.1 -5.3 1. -18.2 -19.4 -0.3 -31.3 1.0 3.2 3.4 21.6 -42.0
Wood Prod. 15.5 3.7 -1.1 -0.5 19.7 41.3 -1.7 47.9 13.5 -11.8 -5.7 -19.8 -4.7
Furniture
Fixtures -16.4 -3.4 -2.6 -10.1 -6.2 4.4 0.8 -39.7 2.9 -2.9 -11.3 -11.1 -5.2
Paper Prod. 10.9 3.2 -1.8 6.6 5.5 72.7 0.3 15.5 10.9 -0.5 3.1 5.9 14.4
Printing
Publishing -0.8 0.4 0.0 -0.3 3.1 9.9 0.3 0.2 5.0 -0.5 0.4 4.8 21.6
Chemicals 26.4 43.0 -0.8 1.1 68.6 466.7 1.1 33.2 56.7 0.6 5.2 87.9 10.0
Petrol. Prod. 3.8 26.0 4.0 2.0 11.5 60.0 3.6 120.4 25.0 3.0 1.5 1.8 41.8
Rubber Prod. 3.2 4.9 -0.8 0.2 52.0 129.5 0.7 54.6 16.4 -0.6 -2.4 4.2 12.3
Nonmetal
Mineral Prod. 4.4 0.1 -3.4 -0.6 -1.2 42.9 2.1 5.8 7.5 -1.0 -2.8 0.0 4.6
Glass Prod. -0.2 3.3 -1.5. -1.6 3.5 17.3 1.0 -5.1 3.2 -0.5 -2.8 0.8 -0.5
Iron, Steel 27.5 28.5 -1.0 -0.2 . 31.8 231.9 -0.9 40.3 17.3 0.1 11.3 8.8 24.1
Nonferrous
Metals 5.3 20.5 -0.1 0.8 13.4 57.8 0.3 30.3 9.3 1.8 3.5 9.8 14.2
Metal Prod. -14.6 6.0 -10.3 -3.9 -10.6 75.9 0.3 -2.2 12.7 -8.3 -27.1 13.2 -75.7
Nonelectrical
Machinery 30.7 20.4 6.5 4.1 88.9 449.9 0.4 86.0 30.9 1.6 31.1 59.1 97.7
Electrical
Machinery 5.6 2.3 -2.5 -1.9 14.3 99.7 1.1 8.7 19.2 -1.7 13.5 29.1 11.1
Transport
Equipment 10.7 5.0 5.1 3.3 73.3 338.8 0.2 99.2 24.0 8.4 36.3 3.1 124.0
Misc. Mfrs. 20.1 26.3 -13.7 -7.3 36.1 237.4 2.2 24.4 44.1 -10.2 9.5 117.5 66.2
NONTRADABLES
Mining, Quarrying 12.9 8.8 -0.1 13.8 13.7 128.0 0.2 48.0 18.5 6.2 5.9 31.2 27.9
Utilities -2.6 -0.5 -0.8 -1.3 -0.0 -1.4 -0.6 5.1 -7.8 -0.7 -2.7 -14.4 -3.1
Construction -16.8 -31.2 5.9 -3.9 -63.7 -406.0 -0.2 -87.6 -82.2 2.5 2.7 -45.2 -28.8
Wholesale Trade -43.5 -65.9 -2.2 -8.6 -104.4 -512.3 -7.5 -148.8 -93.8 -6.8 -22.5 -80.0 -68.3
Transportation -4.7 -10.4 -2.0 -1.4 -10.4 -110.4 -2.0 -9.7 -28.1 -1.8 -6.9 -25.4 -7.0
Financial Services -13.7 -13.1 -0.1 -3.4 -32.7 -240.2 -1.3 -31.1 -24.2 -0.6 -13.5 -68.4 -21.6
Personal Services -49.4 -41.9 -1.8 -11.3 -107.7 -666.7 -6.2 -32.8 -97.9 -10.1 -49.1 -110.1 -105.4
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